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UTILITY AND COMMUNITY: MUSINGS ON THE
TORTICRIME DISTINCTION
STEPHEN MARKS*

INTRODUCrION

This Paper results from musings on an observation made previously by
several authors: In determining the socially optimal level of enforcement of
criminallaw, society typically should not consider the utility gained by the
criminal from the criminal act.' However, if the social utility function
used to determine optimal enforcement does not include the utility of
criminal acts then it cannot explain which acts we criminalize in the first
place. Thus, if both criminalization and enforcement decisions have social utilitarian explanations then these explanations must use different social utility functions. Additionally, if the discrediting of a wrongdoer's
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. I presented this Paper, in
somewhat altered form, at the Boston University School of Law Conference on the
Tort/Crime Distinction. I thank conference organizers, especially Professors Ken
Simons and Bob Bone, and the staff and editors of the Boston University Law Review.
I thank Professor Alvin Klevorick, who discussed this Paper in the conference, who
provided additional insightful comments in discussions after the conference, and
whose written comments helped to improve this final draft. I thank Professor Mark
Pettit for reading and rereading this Paper and for his many useful suggestions and
support, Professor Ken Simons for our many interesting discussions (often on the
run), Carmela Correale, Peter Fernandez, and Chris Wagner for their invaluable
technical support, Dennis Marks for his careful comments on an earlier draft, and
Mary, Olivia, and Claire. This Paper is dedicated to the memory of Jay.
1 For example, Coffee comments that by virtue of its role in communicating public
norms and values, "the criminal law often and necessarily displays a deliberate disdain
for the utility of the criminalized conduct to the defendant." John C. Coffee, Does
"Unlawful" Mean "Criminal?": Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction In American Law," 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 193-94 (1991); see also Kenneth G. DauSchmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as Preference-Shaping Policy,
1990 DUKE L.J. 1, 11-13 (observing that "the notion of including criminal benefits in
the concept of social welfare seems to defy common sense"); Alvin K. Klevorick,
Legal Theory and the Economic Analysis of Torts and Crimes, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
905, 918 (1985) (observing that in discussions of crime, the "injurer's benefits" are
afforded little, if any weight in the former); Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the
Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1234
(1985) (noting "society's apparent tendency to impute little value to acts for which the
private benefits inhere in a party's enjoyment of the disutility suffered by the victim").
For purposes of the following discussion, I will use the words act, action, and activity interchangeably, with no distinction in meaning.
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utility distinguishes crimes from torts, then an examination of this phenomenon could shed some light on the subject matter of this Symposium.
In this Paper, I propose the following two step procedure to explain
both the inclusion and exclusion of criminal utility. As a first step, I posit
a full compliance utility function. This utility function includes all utilities
for all activities and incorporates an assumption that all members of society will forego prohibited activities. As a preliminary matter, I will also
presuppose common information and shared values within the community. I suggest that maximization of full compliance social utility determines what society prohibits. As a second step, I strip the social utility
function of the utility from prohibited activities and drop the assumption
of full compliance. I suggest that maximization of this stripped social utility function determines degrees of deterrence and enforcement.
This explanation contains both utilitarian and communitarian elements.
Society uses the unstripped version of the social utility function to generate rules governing community behavior. In turn, these rules define
membership in the community. In this manner, the community defines
itself. Violating a rule separates one from the community, at least as to
that act. By stripping criminal utility from the social utility function, society confirms that extracommunity acts will not receive credit. Typical
punishments for crimes, such as imprisonment, exile, and even death,
symbolize this separation from the community. Even crimes that we do
not punish by imprisonment, exile, or death stigmatize because they represent a judgment of detachment from society.2
The full compliance utility function can provide us with additional insights into the nature of crimes and torts. For example, even in a full
compliance world we would expect society to classify some activities as
prohibited, others as permissible conditional on the payment of compensation, and yet others as unconditionally permissible. In this world, a prohibited act could carry the label "crime" while we would subject a conditionally permissible act to tort liability.3 Further, much of what we
consider as torts in the real world would fall under the category of crimes.
Careless driving becomes virtually indistinguishable from theft.
Many of the characteristics of crimes and torts, as we know them, appear only as we begin relaxing the above assumptions. Relaxing the assumption of full compliance requires us to deal with the commission and
deterrence of prohibited acts. Relaxing the common information assumption means we must worry about error and its incentive effects. Two
internally consistent strategies for dealing with prohibited acts arise in an
2

In the real world, as opposed to our full compliance, common information,

shared values society, we use tort law, as well as criminal law, to address prohibitions.

This accounts for the moral stigma attached to some torts. See infra.
I However, we would have to make this classification on the basis of some criteria
other than deterrence because full compliance eliminates issues of deterrence. We
only consider issues of deterrence once we relax the assumption of full compliance.
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environment of information deficiency. The crime strategy uses penalties
coupled with protections.4 The tort strategy uses compensation coupled
with correlatedproxies.5
Tort then turns out to have a dual nature. It forms part of a strategy for
dealing with prohibited acts. It also forms part of a compensation mechanism for conditionally permissible acts. The tort duality thus explains the
moral stigma attached to certain tortious activities. However, this duality
does not correspond to the divide between negligence and strict liability.
Both negligence and 6strict liability address prohibited and conditionally
permissible behavior.
The following discussion addresses three challenges arising from our
efforts to distinguish crimes and torts. First, I shall attempt to resolve the
apparent conflict between criminal utility inclusion and exclusion by positing a utilitarian-communitarian model accounting for both phenomena.
Second, I seek to demonstrate that crime and tort represent two internally consistent strategies for addressing prohibited behavior in an environment of information deficiency. Finally, I address the dual nature of tort
law.
Part I gives a brief background of some of the current thinking about
the tort-crime frontier. Part II elaborates on the criminal utility conundrum: the linchpin of my efforts. Part III presents a shared values, common information, full compliance model. Parts IV and V relax the full
compliance and common information assumptions, respectively.7 Part VI
summarizes.
I.

SOME CURRENT THINKING ABOUT THE TORT/CRIME DISTINCrION

Explorers returning from the border area between tort and crime have
brought back many interesting observations and ideas. We can separate
these thoughts into three related categories. First, we can describe the
4 Infra Part V.B.

r Infra Part V.A. (defining same as an observable variable sufficiently related to an
otherwise unobservable variable such that the former may be utilized to approximate
the latter).
6 Perhaps this prevents resolution of the debate between corrective-justice proponents and economic-incentive proponents regarding the -true nature of negligence.
Compare JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 361-85 (1992) (suggesting that the
tort law is best explained by the principle of corrective justice, which imposes a "duty
to repair" wrongful losses), with William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851 (1982) (contending that considerations of economic efficiency provide the superior explanatory framework). See
also Richard A. Posner, The Concept of Collective Justice in Recent Theories of Tort
Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 188 (1981) (suggesting that an accurate account of the
Aristotelian concept of corrective justice is "compatible with, and indeed required by,
the economic theory of tort").
7 I leave relaxation of the shared values assumption for another day.
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classificationscheme by which society designates some activities as crimes
and others as torts. Second, we can describe the consequences that flow
from labeling an activity a crime or a tort. Finally we can develop ideas
about the relationship between classification and its consequences.
A.

Classification Criteria

In describing criminal and tortious activity, various scholars have
sought to identify the salient characteristics of activities that fall into each
category. For example, some observers characterize crimes as intentional, serious, and not requiring actual harm. Conversely, torts are not so
serious, do not require intent, and require harm.8
Other scholars focus on less obvious characteristics. For example, Coffee suggests that the continuity of a prohibition determines whether we
label it a crime or a tort.9 We label continuous (categorical) prohibitions
as crimes and discontinuous prohibitions as torts. 10 In a similar vein,
Hurd" distinguishes between criminal activity as creating harms and torts
that create a risk of harm.
Others adopt a more functional approach to distinguishing tortious
from criminal activities. Klevorick"2 views criminal sanctions as a punishment for violating rules involving the transaction structure of society.
8 See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 1, at 224 (identifying same as characteristics of the
criminal law but arguing that "the factor that most distinguishes the criminal law is its
operation as a system of moral education and socialization"); Richard A. Epstein,
Crime and Tort: Old Wine in Old Bottles, in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL: RESTITUTION,
RETRIBUTION, AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 231, 248 (Randy E. Barnett & John Hagel
III, eds., 1977) ("Briefly put, the position must be that the intention to harm is immaterial (to the primafacie case) in the tort law, whereas the actual harm itself is immaterial to the criminal law.").
9 See Coffee, supra note 1, at 225-28.
10 I will use the following definitions. For a continuous prohibition, small changes
in the activity cannot make the activity permissible. We can label such prohibitions as
categorical. For a discontinuous prohibition, small changes in the activity can change
the status from prohibited to permissible. For example, driving a bit more carefully
may make driving permissible. Driving a bit more carelessly may make driving impermissible. In this respect, the prohibition is discontinuous. Cf. infra note 19 and
accompanying text (identifying a classification consequence approach to crimes and
torts wherein crimes are characterized by discontinuous sanctions and torts are characterized by continuous pricing).
I' Heidi M. Hurd, The Deontology of Negligence, 76 B.U. L. REv. 249, 263 (1996)
("For if deontological maxims are maxims that prohibit wrongdoing, and wrongdoing
consists in causally-complex actions ... and negligence consists, not in actions that
cause harm, but in actions that risk harm, then negligence cannot constitute a violation of any deontological maxims."); see also id. at 272 (suggesting that "tort law appears to be about consequential wrongs, while criminal law appears to be about deontological wrongs").
12 Klevorick, supra note 1, at 907-08 (suggesting that crimes encompass conduct
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Criminal law supports this structure."3 This approach builds on the earli-

er work of Calabresi and Melamed, who posited a system of rules (property, liability, and inalienability) designed to protect and/or govern the
transfer of legal "entitlements."' 4 Calabresi and Melamed suggest a distinction between crimes (i.e., theft) and torts (i.e., an automobile accident) premised on whether society chooses to permit or prohibit noncon-

sensual transfers of entitlements. 5 Under this analysis, the tort law
represents a mechanism for the involuntary, but permissible, transfer or
law provides for categoridestruction of an entitlement while the criminal
6
cal prohibitions of nonconsensual transfers.'

Not all transaction structure theories support the tort/crime distinction.
In Posner's view, we impose both criminal and tort liability for transactions that violate the rules of consensual transfer.'7 We impose criminal
liability only when tort liability fails to deter "market bypassing."'" In the
Klevorick approach, criminal law supports the transaction structure

(which incorporates property, tort, and contract law) while in the Posner
approach both criminal and tort law support the transaction structure
(represented by property law). Thus, the Posner transaction structure explains the function of both criminal and tort law but not the distinction
between them. Under the Posner view we must distinguish between
crime and tort on some other basis.
B.

Consequences of Classification

As to consequences, various scholars have observed that labeling an
activity criminal carries with it certain procedural protections not found
that contravenes "the terms or conditions under which particular transactions or exchanges are to take place under different circumstances").
13 Id. at 908 ("[T]he criminal sanction imposes a penalty on the criminal for his
effort to secure an unfair advantage by seeking to avoid complying with the transaction structure ...to which the other members of society conform their conduct.").
14 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1089-93 (1972).
Under the Calabresi/Melamed approach, property rules provide for the consensual,
voluntary transfer of an entitlement at a price determined by the seller. Liability rules
govern and provide for the involuntary transfer or destruction of an entitlement
priced at some objectively determined value. Id. at 1092.
15 Id. at 1126-27.
16 Id at 1126 ("[W]e impose criminal sanctions as a means of deterring future attempts to convert property rules into liability rules.").
17 Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L.
REv. 1193, 1195 (1985) ("The major function of the criminal law in a capitalist society
is to prevent people from bypassing the system of voluntary, compensated exchange
...
in situations where, because transaction costs are low, the market is a more efficient method of allocating resources than forced exchange."); see also RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 7.1 (1992) (same).
18 Posner, supra note 17, at 1195.

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:215

in tort law. Others have observed that penalties for crimes and torts differ. Criminal penalties include incarceration and death. The state collects criminal fines. Victims of torts typically collect monetary damages.
In his discussion of penalties, Cooter contributes the idea that we
"price" otherwise permissible behavior and "sanction" prohibited con-

duct.' 9 In Cooter's framework, both criminal and tort law sanction pro-

hibited behavior while strict liability law prices permissible behavior.
As mentioned earlier,20 some commentators note that as a consequence of criminalizing an activity, we should no longer count the utility
of the criminal in determining the amount of enforcement to engage in.
Other scholars reject this view.2 x
Some observations can fit either as a classification criterion or as a consequence of classification. For example, some argue that criminal activity
carries with it an idea of moral condemnation. This could mean either
that we criminalize morally outrageous activities, defined by some other
criteria, or that, as a consequence of criminalizing an activity, we bring
moral condemnation to the actor.2 2
19 Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1523-24 (1984).
Cooter contrasts the relative discontinuity and continuity of sanctions and prices, respectively:
A sanction typically creates an abrupt jump in an individual's costs when he passes from the permitted zone [subject to pricing] into the forbidden zone where
behavior is sanctioned. This abrupt jump in costs disappears if the sanction is
replaced by a price. Behavior is more elastic with respect to changes in prices
than to changes in sanctions.
Id.; see also Coffee, supra note 1, at 194 ("Characteristically, tort law prices while
criminal law prohibits.").
20 Supra note 1.
21 See Alvin K. Klevorick, On the Economic Theory of Crime, in NOMOS XXVII:
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 289, 292-94 (J. Roland Patrick & John W. Chapman eds., 1985)
(surveying optimal enforcement models in which "utility to offenders is counted in the
social welfare function").
Consider the task of setting optimal damage amounts for a given probability of
detection. If we count utility we would set the damage amount to D = L/p where "L"
symbolizes the loss to society and "p" symbolizes the probability of detection. See
Posner, supra note 17, at 1203. If we do not credit utility then we would set the
penalty at D > B/p where B symbolizes the benefit to the criminal of the act. In the
former case, the criminal activity occurs if benefit to the criminal exceeds the loss to
the rest of society. In the latter case, we set the penalty so as to minimize criminal
activity.
22 Or both. For example, the core of criminal activities would raise moral outrage
even if we did not criminalize them. We may criminalize other activities in order to
use moral condemnation as a sanction. Coffee has argued that if we do too much of
the latter then people will no longer associate criminalization with moral condemnation. Coffee, supra note 1, at 238 ("[S]tigma is a scarce resource. Society does not
have an unlimited capacity to express condemnation or to feel revulsion.").
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C. Relating Classification and Consequences
Classification and the consequences flowing therefrom make sense only if they bear some relation to each other. Thus scholars focus considerable energy on explaining this relationship. Some scholars base the distinction between tort and criminal law on their respective capacities to
deter socially inefficient activity.' Under this view, both crimes and torts
discourage some types of undesirable activities. We distinguish crimes
and torts not so much in terms of any essential difference in the type of
activity targeted, but by the incentives they generate. We discourage intentional homicide for the same reason we discourage carelessness; to
permit either results in a higher risk of death or injury and, consequently,
lower social utility. We construct a system of fines, incarceration, and
compensation in order to optimally discourage both types of behavior.
We use criminal law for homicide because given the characteristics of the
action, the actor, and the penalties, it more efficiently deters such conduct. For example, some argue that, in order to optimize incentives, we
should grade harmful activities by the potential for harm. Harm more
likely occurs when the actor intends to harm. Thus these scholars connect
a classification criterion (intent) to a consequence of classification (enhanced penalties). In short, social utility maximization forms the basis of
the inquiry into what to criminalize or make tortious.
Coffee provides another instance of connecting classification and consequences by arguing that moral condemnation as a consequence only
makes sense with continuous (categorical) prohibitions. He argues that
applying criminal law to discontinuous (noncategorical) prohibitions
weakens the moral condemnation attached to it.24 Again, he focuses on
efficient methods of social control.
II.

THE CRIMINAL UTILITY CONUNDRUM

I will begin my own discussion of the tort/crime distinction by contrasting two views of criminal law. The first view holds that we must exclude
criminal utility. The second view holds that we must include all utility,
including criminal utility.
23 See Posner, supra note 17, at 1195-205 (noting that both tort and criminal law
operate to deter "market bypassing," although a potential private defendant's inability to pay optimal damages often renders the former ineffective as a deterrent).
24 Supra note 22. Coffee utilizes Cooter's notion that we price permissible behavior and sanction prohibited behavior, supra note 19, to support his position that the
criminal law is, in essence, a system of moral education:
If we view the criminal law as largely a socializing system of moral propaganda,

reasons come into focus that explain why its natural style is to prohibit [and apply
a discontinuous sanction] rather than to price. The answer lies in the voice that
such a system must use. First, it must be clear and unequivocal, and second, it
prefers to deal in moral absolutes.

Coffee, supra note 1, at 225.
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Excluding Criminal Utility

Suppose the law has defined a crime and its punishment but that there
remains the issue of how many resources to devote to enforcement. Let
us assume that the more resources spent, the higher the detection rate,
the lower the losses to victims, and the greater the losses to criminals.
Consider these numbers:
EXHIBIT

1

(A)
Resources
Spent on
Detection
0
200
400
600
800
* Relative to No

(B)
(C)
Losses to
Losses to
Victims
Criminals*
2500
0
1500
350
1000
600
700
750
600
800
Resources Spent on Detection

A+B+C
2500
2050
2000
2050
2200

A+B
2500
1700
1400
1300
1400

As resources spent on detection rise, the rate of detection increases,
deterring some potential criminals. As a result, losses to victims fail and
losses to criminals increase. Which level of resource expenditure should
society adopt? Consider two possible answers. We could choose the
level of detection expenditure that minimizes A+B+C. We can call this
the criminal-inclusive criterion because the measure of net social cost
includes the cost to all members of society, including criminals. Second,
we could invest in detection so as to minimize A+B. We can call this the
criminal-exclusive criterion because the measure of net social cost
excludes criminals or, more precisely, excludes utility gained from
criminal acts. If we use the criminal-inclusive criterion, we adopt a level
of resource expenditure of 400. If we use the criminal-exclusive criterion
we adopt a level of resource expenditure of 600.
Most people, when faced with this problem, choose 600, the
expenditure corresponding to the criminal-exclusive criterion. Indeed,
suppose that a policy maker chooses the criminal-inclusive criterion, sets
resource expenditure at 400 and now tries to explain the decision to his or
her constituents. An honest explanation would resemble this one: "True,
moving from 400 to 600 results in a net gain of 100 to law abiding
citizens. 5 But we will not do it because it also imposes an additional cost
of 150 on the criminals and thus lowers social efficiency." One can well
imagine the response.
25 Resources spent on detection increase by 200 and losses to victims fall by 300
(from 1000 to 700), leaving a net benefit of 100.

1996]

MUSINGS ON THE TORT/CRIME DISTINCTION

223

B. Including Criminal Utility

The reasoning behind the choice of 600 appears to deprive the social
utility function of any explanatory power about which actions to criminalize. One cannot remove criminal behavior from the social utility function
and then use this function to determine criminality without falling into
tautology. Thus if we believe in a possible social utility rationale for criminality, then we must use a version of the social utility function that does
not presuppose criminality. We must use a social utility function that includes the utilities of all actions of all actors.2" We criminalize actions if
doing so increases social utility.
C. The Criminal Utility Conundrum

Thus we face a conundrum. How can we use a social utility function to
account for criminality if we have removed criminal utility from the social
utility function? Perhaps we cannot. Klevorick argues that the rationale
for discounting criminal utility "must be rooted in noneconomic considerations."" Yet we could incorporate even noneconomic considerations into a social utility function. This leaves us with the same conundrum.
I suggest an answer to the conundrum. We need not choose between
inclusion and exclusion. Rather we should recognize that society engages, consciously or unconsciously, in a two step process. In the first
step, society includes all utilities in determining what to criminalize. In
the second step, society excludes criminal utility in determining levels of
enforcement. The following explanation elaborates on this simple model.
III.

SOCIAL OPTIMIZATION WITH FULL COMPLIANCE

A. A Preliminary Model

Let us suppose an imaginary world in which the following assumptions
apply:
Shared Values: Everyone shares the same values about what consti-

2
tutes a good society. 8

ignore well-known problems of moral monstrousness. Assume for now that
our society does not have any moral monsters.
27 Klevorick, supra note 1, at 918.
28 When I say that everyone shares the same values, I do not mean that everyone
has the same individual utility function. Although possessing distinct individual utility
functions, individuals share the same vision of the social utility function. For example,
although having different individual utility functions, everyone could agree that society should be organized to maximize the sum of individual utility. (Other forms of the
social utility function are also possible.)
26 1
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Common Information: Everyone has the same objective view of reali29
ty.
Full Compliance: Everyone agrees to comply and, in fact, does so.30
Under an assumption of full compliance, we only have to make rules;
we never need to enforce them. Because we do not need to enforce rules
we do not worry about the incentive effects of punishment. I will spend
some time speculating about this world because I wish to use it as a lens
through which we can examine our own. I will relax the assumptions
below.
Imagine the inhabitants of our shared values, common information, full
compliance world sitting around the table discussing the promulgation of
laws. What types of laws might we expect to see in such a world? To
model law creation in this society, let us posit that members choose laws
to maximize their shared social utility function. In this conception, I take
a full bodied approach to the social utility function. The social utility
function takes into account the individual utilities of the members of society. I will also assume that the members' utility functions may incorporate not only goods and services, but also values such as freedom, autonomy and respect. Finally, these individual utility functions may also
include the utilities of other members of society.
.I will assume that this society divides activities into three categories:
prohibited activities, activities that are permissible only if accompanied
by compensation, and unconditionally permissible activities. The division
of activities results from an optimization process that chooses from the
set of possible divisions the one that maximizes social utility."' We could
then establish a procedure for the determination and payment of compensation. This process would resemble strict liability law. Again, we
would not need an enforcement mechanism under our assumption of full
compliance.

29 There may still exist uncertainty, however. In this case, everyone shares the
same information about the probabilities of events.

30

This implies an assumption that we can specify laws in sufficient detail.

31

A simple way to look at this is through the following thought experiment. Sup-

pose that, although persons have different utility functions, all agree that the division

of activities among those permitted, permitted conditionally, and prohibited, should
be made so that the sum of personal utilities is maximized. Thus we would consider
one division and calculate the resultant total utility. Then we would consider another
division and make the same calculation. We would continue this process until we
found the division that maximizes total utility. In this manner, the optimization process takes into account all utility, even the utility from activities that are ultimately
prohibited. (Note that I use this additive utility function only as an example. Then
social utility function could be much more complex taking into account many other
factors including the distribution of utility.)
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Compensated Activities

B.

Three questions spring to mind. First, why do we ever require compensation? In our full compliance world compensation cannot depend on
fault or deterrence. Second, why should we not always require compensation? Should not a person always compensate for his or her externalities even if we permit the activity? Third, why should we ever prohibit an
activity? Why not permit all activities as long as the actor pays compensation?
Consider the first question. In our world one can indeed imagine that
the citizens might never require compensation for permissible acts. Still,
a rule requiring compensation for some activities may produce more social utility than a rule that does not require compensation for any. Because we cannot observe individual utility directly the permissibility of an
act cannot depend on this variable. Nevertheless, society may wish to
permit certain activities if the activity results in sufficiently high utility to
the actor. Requiring compensation may help to accomplish this goal. In
this sense, we "price" conditionally permissible activities.
In addition, the social utility function will almost certainly account for
distribution. A compensation requirement will therefore result in a different level of social utility-perhaps a higher level-than would be the
case in its absence.
C. Noncompensated Activities
Why do we not require compensation for all activities? First, transaction costs may make compensation for every action intractable. In practice we may want to remove the compensation requirement for some activities due to high transaction costs. In addition, for modest
externalities, the costs may fall fairly evenly across the population over a
relatively short period of time. This may eliminate distributional reasons
for requiring compensation.
Second, requiring compensation for all permissible activities may lead
to unworkable causation problems. Consider the case of an automobile
accident. In order to apply compensation we need to know who caused
the accident. We need to know who imposed costs on whom. In economic terms, this involves identifying the externality. However, as Coase
demonstrated in The Problem of Social Cost, 2 it takes two to create an
externality. Consequently, we find ourselves faced with problems of attribution. If person A engages in activity X and person B engages in
activity Y which together produce cost C, how do we know how much of
the cost to attribute to A and how much to B? In short, difficult causation issues can accompany almost any compensation rule. 3
32

R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1,2 (1960) (noting the

reciprocal nature of harmful effects as between competing interests).
33 Indeed, causation problems led Holmes to reject the notion of strict liability as
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ProhibitedActivities

Finally, why do we unconditionally prohibit some acts? Bargaining
may produce socially superior results to permitting an activity even with
compensation. Arguments over the type of activities best regulated by
compensation versus prohibition for this society involves the types of reasoning pioneered by Calabresi and Melamed"4 and which continues today
in the works of Ayres and Talley, 5 and Kaplow and Shavell"6 concerning
the types of transactions best governed by property rules (and thus subject to prohibitions) and those best governed by liability rules (and thus

subject to compensation).
E. Crimes and Torts

The tripartite classification scheme of our model society explicitly accounts for the conditional permissibility of some activities. Strict liability
(tort) law provides a list of conditionally permissible acts and a mechanism for the payment of compensation. Criminal law consists of a list of
prohibitions. In this simple world, strict liability law and criminal law
both support a transaction structure defined by such laws as property law,
contract law, corporation law, the law of estates and trusts, tax law, commercial law, and securities law. 7 Property law, for example, represents a
judgment about which acts to prohibit and which to permit. We prohibit

nonconsensual transfers (i.e., theft); we permit consensual exchanges.
Contract law reflects a similar judgment. We permit consensual agreements (with exceptions) and permit their breach conditionally on the payment of compensation.
F. Some Observations on the Nature of Criminal Activity
To recap, our society has formulated a set of legal rules designed to
maximize a commonly held social utility function under the assumptions
of shared values, common information, and full compliance. We assume

that, even with a long list of prohibited activities, our citizens internalize
the defining concept of tort law.

OLIVER

W. HOLMES,

JR., THE COMMON LAW

90-95

(Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1881).
34 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 14, at 1090-92 (discussing the roles of property and liability rules in protecting legal "entitlements").
35 Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining:Dividing a Legal Entitlement to
FacilitateCoasean Trade, 104 YALE. L.J. 1027, 1039-47 (1995) (discussing the differential effects of liability rules and property rules on bargaining parties' incentives to
reveal information).
36 Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules 1 (Mar.
1, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Boston University Law Review)
(asserting that "individuals' possessory interests in things are generally protected by
property rules, whereas their interests in not suffering from harmful externalities are
often, though not always, protected only by liability rules").
37 I have made no assumption about what the transaction structure should be.
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the prohibitions in an intuitive sense. In addition, we establish a compensation structure for determining compensation for conditionally permissible activities.
This society could prohibit many types of acts. Our citizens may
choose to prohibit murder, rape, assault, and theft for a variety of reasons. They may also choose to prohibit unreasonably unsafe driving. We
may permit safe driving unconditionally because compensation runs into
the causation and transaction cost problems mentioned above. Thus we
might permit uncompensated safe driving but prohibit unsafe driving.
Given our assumption that everyone knows what constitutes safe and unsafe driving and that everyone complies, we can treat unsafe driving as we
treat any other prohibited act.
G.

Uncertainty and Continuity

In particular, note that, in this society, the criminalization of certain
conduct does not depend on the certainty or uncertainty of consequent
harm. Thus, in the real world, the relevance of uncertainty, if any, must
come from relaxing some of the assumptions that define our simple
world.
Similarly, in our model society, criminality does not depend on the continuity or discontinuity of its classification. As mentioned above, 8 we
can create a classification discontinuity by classifying such that an arbitrarily small change in behavior can cause a change from one classification (e.g., prohibited, conditionally permissible, permissible) to another.
Diagrammatically, we can think of activities subject to discontinuous and
continuous classification.
To get a feel for these diagrams, think of the horizontal dimension as
reflecting a continuous variable such as level of care. In this case, we
prohibit activity A regardless of an actor's level of care. (We prohibit
homicide no matter how much care the murderer takes.) We prohibit
activity D for lower levels of care but permit it at higher levels. (We
prohibit careless driving but permit careful driving.) In our shared-values, common-information, full-compliance world discontinuity does not
bar criminality. Later, as we enter more complicated worlds, I will argue
that continuity may indeed matter.

m Supra notes 9, 24.
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EXHIBIT 2
CONTINUOUS (CATEGORICAL) CLASSIFICATION

A

Prohibited

B

Conditionally Permissible

C

Permissible
DiscoNTINuous CLASSIFICATIONS

D

Prohibited

Permissible

E

Prohibited

Conditionally Permissible

F

Conditionally Permissible

G

Prohibited

Permissible

Conditionally Permissible

Permissible

H. Negligence
Although discontinuity is not a bar to criminality (e.g., activity D), it
can provide a preliminary explanation of negligence law. In those activities where discontinuity exists between the conditionally permissible and
the unconditionally permissible (activity F), and where we take the level
of care as the continuous variable, an action for compensation would resemble a negligence action.3 9
IV. A

WORLD WITHOUT FULL COMPLIANCE

I will begin the transition from our imaginary world to the real world
by first relaxing the full compliance assumption and then the common
information assumption.
Consider a world identical to our imaginary world except that we no
longer have full compliance. I continue to assume that citizens share the
same societal values and that they benefit from common information.
Thus we can completely specify the law and, although we cannot count on
full compliance, each member knows the law. However, some may still
39 We must take care here, however, because in the language of negligence, the

defendant has done something he or she should not have done. Perhaps more aptly,
activity F explains cases in which we consider dangerousness as the continuous variable and we must make a determination of whether strict liability should apply. In our
shared values, perfect information, full compliance world, no prohibited actions ever
occur. As a necessary result, liability will only attach to conditionally permissible actions. Thus in suits involving type-F conduct, a decision to require compensation will
not imply that the actor should not have committed the act.
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choose to violate that law.40
A.

Two Step Process
Given that its members may commit prohibited acts, our modified society must go beyond determining which acts to prohibit, compensate, or
permit; it must also decide how to respond to noncompliance. We can
imagine our decision makers engaging in a two step process. Initially,
they might consider the sort of laws-prohibiting, compensating, and permitting-they would pass if they could rely on full compliance. Next,
they might consider modifying these laws and policies to account for noncompliance.
The first step-determining which actions to prohibit, to compensate,
or to permit under an assumption of full compliance-involves use of a
social utility function that includes utility generated by all activities prior
to classification. The second step-modifying the law and articulating an
enforcement policy-involves the use of a social utility function stripped
of the utility generated by prohibited activities.
B.

Community and Utility
In our world of shared values and common information, this two step
process and its two distinct social utility functions makes sense. 4 ' In determining the sorts of activities to prohibit, compensate, or permit, the
society credits the utility of all its members and all of its activities. In this
world, the decision makers unanimously decide which laws will define
their community.42 In this first step, we constitute the community.
In moving to practical problems of enforcement, the society takes the
definition of the community as given. Decision makers strip the social
utility function of utility gained from prohibited acts and commit resources to enforcement commensurate with minimizing losses to law
abiding citizens.
The two step process thus has both utilitarian and communitarian components. Society uses the unstripped version of the societal utility function to define the community. This utility function generates rules that
govern community behavior. Violating a rule separates one from the
community, at least as to that act. By stripping criminal utility from the
societal utility function for purposes of enforcement, society confirms
that it will not credit extracommunity acts.
40 One may have a notion of what constitutes an ideal set of laws and still choose
to disobey some, or even all, of those laws. The prisoners' dilemma exemplifies this
notion. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Harrison, Egoism, Altruism, and Market Illusions: The
Limits of Law and Economics, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1309, 1343-48 (1986) (discussing the
prisoners' dilemma construct and gathering relevant sources).
41 By "make sense" I mean that it provides a reasonable social utilitarian description of how laws are made and enforcement levels set.
42 Unanimity comes from the shared values assumption.
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C. Compensation and Punishmentfor ProhibitedActs
In a less-than-full-compliance world, society must decide how to react
to the commission of prohibited acts. Compensation and punishment
may modify behavior in a way that will enhance social utility. In considering their effect on behavior we should consider all the channels through
which incentives operate. A system of punishments may affect individual
cost-benefit calculations prior to engaging in prohibited conduct or, more
indirectly, may enhance the moral credibility of the legal system and thus
induce compliance through moral suasion. Additionally, both compensation and punishment may enhance social utility without modifying behavior by affecting distribution.
As a first pass, suppose that this society decides to attach-at a minimum-a compensation requirement to prohibited activities. Requiring
compensation may reduce incentives to engage in prohibited acts. Yet,
we may also want to require compensation regardless of its effects on
behavior. As with conditionally permissible behavior,43 we might attain
higher social utility by requiring compensation, given the effects of compensation on distribution. In addition, requiring compensation for prohibited activities avoids the same causation problems that requiring compensation for permissible activities does." Although problems of
causation may cause us to classify driving reasonably as an unconditionally permissible activity, the same argument does not apply to driving unreasonably. By setting standards of reasonableness, we establish a base
through which we can measure causation. 4 5 An actor causes an accident
if the actor acted negligently and if the accident would not have occurred
had the actor acted reasonably.
Notice that, under a policy of requiring compensation for prohibited
activities, the character of strict liability and negligence differs somewhat
from that in our original model:

43
4

Supra Part III.B.
Supra Part III.C.

45 Epstein has argued that we can resolve these causation problems by limiting the
applicability of the negligence doctrine, expanding the scope of strict liability, and

utilizing causation defenses. Epstein, supra note 8, at 246. Epstein would reserve

negligence to cases in which "there is a special relationship between the parties." Id.
However, how can causation, absent some notion of fault, resolve such issues of liability even in the case of automobile accidents?
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3

CONTINUOUS (CATEGORICAL) CLASSIFICATION

A

Prohibited
(Compensated)

B

Conditionally Permissible
(Compensated)

C

Permissible
(Not Compensated)
DISCONTINUOUS CLASSIFICATION

D

Prohibited
(Compensated)

Permissible
(Not Compensated)

E

Prohibited
(Compensated)

Conditionally Permissible
(Compensated)

F

Conditionally Permissible
(Compensated)

G

Prohibited
(Compensated)

Permissible
(Not Compensated)

Conditionally Permissible
(Compensated)

Permissible
(Not Comp.)

A, B, and E resemble activities subject to strict liability. D, F, and G
resemble activities subject to negligence. In other words, strict liability
now encompasses both conditionally permissible and prohibited acts.
Further, negligence includes both conditionally permissible and
prohibited activities. (In our full compliance world both strict liability
and negligence impled a conditionally permissible act.) Thus neither
negligence law nor strict liability law exclusively "prices" behavior. Nor
does a payment of damages imply that the actor has necessarily done
anything wrong. In addition, the continuity of the consequence does not
necessarily follow the continuity of the classification. Activity E produces

a continuous consequence-compensation-despite

discontinuous

classification.

D. Moral Condemnation and Punishment
If we wanted to distinguish prohibited activities from conditionally permissible activities we could do so by imposing additional costs in the form
of penalties:
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4

CONTINUOUS (CATEGORICAL) CLASSIFICATION

A

Prohibited
(Compensated/Penalized)

B

Conditionally Permissible
(Compensated)

C

Permissible
(Not Compensated)
DiscoNTINuous CLASSIFICATION

Prohibited

Permissible

(Compensated/Penalized)

(Not Compensated)

E

Prohibited
(Compensated/Penalized)

Conditionally Permissible
(Compensated)

F

Conditionally Permissible
(Compensated)

Permissible
(Not Compensated)

G

Prohibited
(Comp./Pen.)

D

Conditionally Permissible
(Compensated)

Permissible
(Not Comp.)

Penalties serve two functions. First, they provide additional incentives.
Second, iif our modified model society, they distinguish prohibited
behavior from conditionally permissible behavior. Penalties signal to the
world that the actor has committed a prohibited act rather than a
conditionally permissible act.
This description provides a preliminary account of the moral
condemnation associated with criminal law. Committing a prohibited act
reflects a rejection of the norms that define a community. A prohibited
act detaches the actor from the community even if momentarily. Not
only does society discredit criminal utility when considering issues of
enforcement and deterrence, it also imposes punishments that symbolize
the separation from the community, such as imprisonment, exile, and
even death. Even crimes that do not result in imprisonment, exile, or
death, stigmatize because they represent a judgment of detachment from
society.
E.

Tort Overlap

The tort system may overlap the criminal system. Consider, for example, activity D, in Exhibit 4. Again, envision the horizontal dimension as
level of care. In this instance, low levels of care constitute a tort and a
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crime, leading to both compensation and a penalty, perhaps in two separate actions. Activity E represents the case of strict liability in tort with
criminal liability for low levels of care. For activity F, low levels of care
result in tort liability but not in criminal liability. For activity G, low
levels of care result in tort liability while even lower levels result in both
criminal and tort liability.
To recap our progress so far, we have relaxed the assumption of our
ideal world model and, in doing so, we have generated a few insights.
Relaxing the assumption of full compliance has produced an explanation
for the criminal utility conundrum that accommodates both utilitarian
and communitarian notions. This process has also demonstrated the absence of a neat divide between the criminal law and tort. Tort law has a
dual nature, encompassing both prohibited and conditionally permissible
acts. However, this duality does not correspond to the divide between
strict liability and negligence.
There remain two implications of this model. First, the criminal law
does not impose costs on permissible activity. Second, the criminal law
(though not exclusively) imposes costs on all prohibited activity. Taken
together, this implies imposing criminal sanctions if and only if the activity is prohibited. In the next section, after relaxing the common information assumption, we will find that the second implication no longer holds.
Under less-than-perfect information, tort law becomes a better strategy
for many problems.
V.

DISPARATE INFORMATION

Even in a shared values, full compliance world members of society may
make mistakes and engage in prohibited acts if there is imperfect information. In a world without full compliance, imperfect information complicates the issue of deterrence. Courts may err and impose penalties or
compensation in inappropriate circumstances. Such mistakes could potentially overdeter permissible acts and underdeter prohibited acts. In
this Part of the Paper, I relax the shared information assumption so that I
am no longer assuming either shared information or full compliance. I
will discuss two strategies for solving the problem of deterrence in such a
world. The first strategy involves minimizing the consequences of mistakes while the second involves minimizing the occurrence of mistakes.
A.

CorrelatedProxies

Suppose that courts cannot observe levels of care. One mechanism the
court might adopt in response to this limitation would be to identify a
correlatedproxy for care. For purposes of this discussion, I define a correlated proxy as an observable variable that correlates with the level of
care. For example, let us suppose that, although we cannot observe the
level of care, we can determine whether an inadvertent act by one of the
parties caused an accident. Let us further suppose that low levels of care
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produce higher probabilities of an inadvertent act than do high levels of
care. In this example, inadvertent acts function as correlated proxies.
Because courts can observe inadvertent acts, courts can impose liability
when an inadvertent act produces an accident even if the court cannot
observe the level of care.
To see this more clearly, consider the following numerical example.
Suppose that a potential injurer and a potential victim each can adopt a
low, medium, or high level of care. Low care costs zero, medium care
costs $20, and high care costs $40. For each actor, low, medium, and high
care produce inadvertent acts with probabilities of .01, .001, and zero,
respectively. Suppose that an inadvertent act by either, or both, players
creates an accident 10% of the time. In the following table I give the
probability of an accident for various levels of care under these assumptions. Note that the probability of an accident does not quite equal 10%
of the sum of the probabilities of inadvertent acts (except when one of
the probabilities equals zero) since on rare occasions two inadvertent acts
may cause an accident.46
EXHIBIT

Potential Victim
Potential Injurer

5:

PROBABILITY OF ACCIDENT

Low Care
C =0
P =.01

Medium Care
C = 20
P = .001

High Care
C = 40
P =0

Low Care
C =0
P = .01

.00199

.001099

.001

Medium Care
C = 20
P = .001

.001099

.0001999

.0001

High Care
C = 40
P=0

.001

.0001

.00

Now let us suppose that, when an accident occurs, it costs $100,000.
The social cost equals the expected accident costs (the probability of an
accident times $100,000) plus the costs of care:
6 The probability of an accident equals .1[1 - (1 - Pv)(1 - PI)], where Pv and P
represent the probabilities of an inadvertent act by the victim and injurer, respectively.
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Potential Victim
Potential Injurer

6:

235

SOCIAL COST OF ACCIDENT

Low Care
C =0
P = .01

Medium Care
C = 20
P = .001

High Care
C = 40
P=0

Low Care
C =0
P = .01

199

129.9

140

Medium Care
C = 20
P = .001

129.9

59.99

70

140

70

80

High Care
C = 40

P=.0

In this example, society minimizes social costs when both injurer and
victim adopt medium care. In the terminology that we have adopted in
this Paper, adopting a low level of care is a prohibited act. In a world in
which we do not assume full compliance, we must consider ways of
deterring prohibited acts.
If the courts could observe care, they could use a negligence rule to
obtain socially optimal results. Such a rule could be formulated in
numerous ways. Suppose that the court adopted a rule of negligence with
contributory negligence (under which a plaintiff's own negligence is a
complete bar to recovery). Under this assumption, the
following table
47
gives the individual expected costs to the two actors:

47 The payout figures in Exhibits 7-9 each correspond to the social cost calculations
in Exhibit 6. Whatever costs are not borne by one party are correspondingly borne by

the other.
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7: EXPECTED PRIVATE COSTS UNDER
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE RULE
(CARE OBSERVANT COURT)

EXHIBIT

Potential Victim
Potential Injurer
Low Care
C=0
P = .01
Medium Care
C = 20
P = .001
High Care
C = 40
P=0

Low Care
C=0
P = .01

Medium Care
C = 20
P = .001

199
0

High Care
C = 40
P=0
20

109.9
109.9

20

100
39.99

20
100

40

40

50
20

30
40

40
40

In this situation the contributory negligence element of the rule
supplies the potential victim with an incentive to adopt medium care
regardless of what the potential injurer does. The potential injurer has an
incentive to adopt medium care. Thus prohibited acts are deterred.
What happens, however, if the courts cannot observe level of care? We
could impose strict liability on the potential injurer. This results in the
following expected costs:
EXHIBIT

8:

EXPECTED PRIVATE COSTS UNDER STRICT LIABILITY RULE
(CARE UNOBSERVABLE BY COURT)

Potential Victim
Potential Injurer
Low Care
C=0
P = .01
Medium Care
C = 20
P = .001
High Care
C = 40
P =0

Low Care
C=0
P = .01

Medium Care
C=20
P = .001
0

199

20
109.9

0
129.9

40
100

20
39.99

0
140

High Care
C=40
P=0

40
30

20
50

40
40

In this case, the potential victim has an incentive to adopt no care no
matter what the potential injurer does. This results in social inefficiency
and unnecessary losses. As an alternative, the court could impose
liability for inadvertent acts. Under this rule, the court imposes liability
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for an accident on the actor who acted inadvertently.4
in the following expected costs:
EXHIBIT

237

Doing so results

9:

EXPECTED PRIVATE COSTS UNDER
INADVERTENT ACT RULE

(CARE UNOBSERVABLE BY COURT)

Potential Victim
Potential Injurer

Low Care
C =0

Medium Care
C = 20

High Care
C = 40

P = .01

P = .001

P=0

Low Care
C=0
P = .01

100
99

Medium Care
C = 20
P = .001

High Care
C= 40
P=0

30
99.9

100
29.9

100

30
29.99

100
40

40

40
30

30
40

40
40

In this case, both the potential injurer and the potential victim will
adopt medium care, resulting in social efficiency.4 9 In a sense, using
inadvertent acts as a correlated proxy for levels of care converts the cost
distribution problem into one of bilateral strict liability.50 Besides
48

I have assumed that if two inadvertent acts occur, then the victim bears the cost

of the accident. We could also make the contrary assumption without affecting the
results because this event occurs so infrequently.
49 The marginal private costs of increasing care exactly mimic those of the injurer
under a strict liability rule and almost exactly mimics those of the victim under a no
liability rule. This result comes, in part, from the low probabilities of inadvertence
and the independence of the inadvertence between the two parties. This results in a
low probability of simultaneous inadvertence. In fact, these probabilities almost certainly overstate the likelihood of an accident in most tort situations. If so, the above
result holds in the usual case.
50 Nevertheless, courts still use the language of negligence. Someone operating a
car using the socially optimal level of care will, in a lifetime of driving, commit an
inadvertent act, such as, failing to look in the side view mirror before changing lanes.
(Perhaps to avoid such inadvertence we would have to install radar.) If unlucky, this
act will cause an accident. Courts will not (and cannot) determine whether the driver
used the socially optimal level of care and, instead, will find the defendant negligent
solely for committing an inadvertent act. See Peter A. Diamond, Single Activity Accidents, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 107, 108, 123-40 (1974) (developing equilibrium models of
tort liability "where full efficiency is not attainable at any level of the judicially controlled variables;" and an actor's level of care has a stochastic (random) element);
Mark F. Grady, Res Ipsa Loquiturand Compliance Error,142 U. PA. L. REV. 887, 895
(1994) (noting an economic account of negligence under which "judicial error causes
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inadvertence, courts may use other correlated proxies. For example, in

product liability cases, courts use product defects as a correlated proxy.51
The use of correlated proxies to impose liability can result in liability
even when an actor employs the optimal level of care. However, this

example suggests that as long as liability results exclusively in
compensation, this possibility will not deter desirable activity. 2 In our
example, both the potential injurer and potential victim adopt the
optimal level of care. However, if we attach additional costs to liability,
we risk suboptimal results. For example, suppose that we penalized
potential injurers $1,000,000 whenever they committed an inadvertent act
as well as requiring compensation according to the above compensation
scheme.5" The resulting costs associated with our model would be
distributed as follows:54
EXHIBIT

10:

EXPECTED PRIVATE COSTS UNDER PENALIZED
INADVERTENT ACT RULE

Potential Victim
Potential Injurer

Low Care
C=0
P = .01
Medium Care
C = 20
P = .001

High Care
C = 40
P=0

Low Care

Medium Care

C =0

C = 20

C = 40

P = .01

P = .001

P = 0

100
10099

30
10099.9

100
1029.9

40
10100

30
1029.99

100
40

High Care

40
1030

30
40

40
40

us to think that people have been negligent when they have really used due care");
Landes & Posner, supra note 6, at 879-80 (suggesting that the existence of negligence
cases may be in part a function of judicial error).
51 For example, if a bottle comes off the line with a defect and the defect results in
an accident, courts will find the producer liable even if the producer used the socially
optimal level of care in production.
52 A more precise statement (applied to the continuous case) is that, under the
right conditions (which are probably quite common), the use of correlated proxies
with compensation will deter a negligible amount of desirable behavior.
r' Thus we would penalize all inadvertent acts by the potential injurer and require
the injurer to pay compensation (in addition to the penalty) if any injury occurred and
the victim had not also committed an inadvertent act. The details of this penalty
scheme do not matter. (We could penalize by incarceration, for example.)
54 In this case, to get private expected costs, we multiply the potential injurer's
probability of inadvertence by $1,000,000 and add this to the potential injurer's expected private costs in Exhibit 9.
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In this case, the potential injurer adopts an inefficiently high level of
care. Note that if we could observe the level of care we would not face
this problem. In that case, we could penalize the potential injurer
$1,000,000 for using a low level of care without worrying that the
potential injurer would adopt an inefficiently high level of care. The
incentive problem comes from using correlated proxies to impose
liability. Thus correlated proxies solve the information problem but only
when used in conjunction with compensation.
B.

Penalties and Protections

In a sense, the strategy of correlated proxies tolerates occasional mistakes (liability when the actor did indeed do the right thing) but limits the
incentive effects of these mistakes by limiting the consequence of liability
to compensation only. However, there may be reasons why we wish to
deter prohibited acts by penalizing certain behavior beyond the mere
payment of compensation. If so, we must first address the possibility that
mistakes will deter desired behavior. Thus if we wish to impose penalties
(and not merely compensation) we must adopt measures to reduce the
probability of error. Such methods include, inter alia, higher standards of
proof, greater specificity, the requirement of intent, strict rules of evidence, and procedural due process. We can also reduce errors by limiting
penalties to continuous (categorical) prohibitions or to the extreme range
of discontinuous prohibitions. 55
C.

Torts and Crimes

The above reasoning identifies two strategies relevant to prohibited behavior. These two strategies correspond roughly to the categories of tort
and crime. The tort strategy imposes compensation on the basis of correlated proxies. The crime strategy imposes penalties but limits liability
through protections such as higher standards of proof, greater specificity,
the requirement of intent, strict rules of evidence, procedural due process, and by limiting its application to continuous (categorical) prohibitions or to the extreme range of discontinuous prohibitions.
In light of the protections involved, the criminal strategy involves
greater expense than the tort strategy. We would expect to apply the
criminal strategy to a limited number of important prohibitions particularly continuous (categorical) prohibitions or the extreme range of discontinuous prohibitions. We would expect to apply the tort strategy to a
larger set of prohibitions including discontinuous prohibitions, and especially those for which we cannot define the discontinuity with a high degree of specificity, e.g., the prohibition not to act unreasonably. As not55 By this, I mean the range of a discontinuous prohibition significantly distant
from the permissible range. See, e.g., supra Exhibit 2, activity G.

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:215

ed before, a criminal strategy does not preclude a simultaneous tort
strategy.
VI.

SUMMARY

I have tried to resolve the apparent conflict between criminal utility
inclusion and exclusion by positing a utilitarian-communitarian model accounting for both phenomena. To this end I have proposed a theoretical
two step procedure relevant to the classification of acts and the enforcement of community standards. This explanation has both utilitarian and
communitarian elements. We use an unstripped version of the social utility function to generate rules that govern community behavior. However,
in considering issues of enforcement, society strips criminal utility from
the social utility function. In doing so, society confirms that extracommunity acts will not receive credit. In other words, society morally condemns these acts. Typical punishments for crimes, such as imprisonment,
exile and even death, symbolize separation from the community. Even
crimes that we do not punish by imprisonment, exile, or death stigmatize
because they represent a judgment of detachment from society.
The full compliance utility function provides insights as to differences
between crimes and torts. Many of the characteristics of crimes and torts,
as we know them, appear only as we begin relaxing the assumptions. Relaxing the assumption of full compliance means we must deal with the
commission of prohibited acts. Relaxing the common information assumption means we must worry about error and its incentive effects.
Thus there appear two internally consistent strategies for dealing with
prohibited acts. The crime strategy uses penalties coupled with protections. The tort strategy uses compensation coupled with correlated proxies.
The cost of protections will limit the application of the criminal strategy
to a relatively small number of important prohibitions. Tort law, with its
use of correlated proxies, has broader application.
Tort law also has the function of addressing conditionally permissible
behavior. Although tort law has a dual nature in this regard, this duality
does not correspond to the divide between negligence and strict liability.
Thus both negligence and strict liability address both prohibited and conditionally permissible behavior. Perhaps this is what makes tort law so
hard to characterize, the tort/crime distinction so hard to define, and the
subject matter of this Symposium so interesting.

